In Satiro v. Maninno the Superior Court found the pro se appellant’s claim waived as a result filing a 29-issue statement of matters complained of on appeal that made it impossible for the trial court to give a comprehensive analysis of the issues.
The Superior Court affirmed the aggregate sentence — 17 to 34 years of incarceration for non-violent offenses — but remanded for the trial court to impose a RRRI minimum term. The Court held that, when a defendant is being sentenced for a non-violent crime, their single prior conviction for a non-enumerated crime of violence does … Read more
Here, the Superior Court dealt with two interrelated orders. The Court ruled the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a PFA, finding that Mother had a reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury by Father. However, the Court vacated a Custody Contempt Order, finding the trial court violated Father’s due process rights … Read more
In Guiser v. Seiber the Superior Court quashed the appeal, in part, because the appellant did not wait for the trial court to rule on post-sentence motions and enter judgment. But the Court did review an order granting injuctive relief because a party has a right to appeal immediately from such relief. The Court held that the … Read more
The Superior Court ruled in B.R.S. v. J.L. that a petitioner had standing to seek a protection from abuse order against his wife’s sister’s husband, as the two were persons related by affinity.
The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s declaratory judgment and held that, because the Franks’ removal of a vehicle from their multi-vehicle insurance changed the stacked amount of underinsured motorist coverage, under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, State Farm was required to provide a new stacking waiver.
Matt Sullivan wrote the brief, which earned a good result for the client in Commonwealth v. Greshan, where, in an unpublished memorandum, the Superior Court agreed the lower court erred in dismissing a PCRA petition.
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of a PFA, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence that Nabiyev knowingly engaged in a course of conduct towards Diaz that placed her in reasonable fear of bodily injury.
The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s order, which granted a motion in lime, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence related to the causation of the victim’s death.
The Superior Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, finding that, because the defendant did not properly preserve an objection during a deposition, the trial court erred when it had granted the defendant’s motion in lime.